University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 8
Number 2 February, 1978

Article 14

2-1978

Recent Decisions - State and Federal: Terry
Examined
James F. Kuhn

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Kuhn, James F. (1978) "Recent Decisions - State and Federal: Terry Examined," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 8 : No. 2 ,
Article 14.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol8/iss2/14

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

ownership, maintenance or use of an uninsured auto." Under this provision of
McKoy's policy, Aetna limits its dollar
liability to a single injured person
(McKoy) at $20,000.
Third, Part lII(d) , the set-off clause
upon which Aetna relied, also modifies
the primary liability of Part I by indicating
that "any amount payable to the insured
under the terms of [the policy] shall be
reduced" by the amount of sums paid to
the insured "on behalf of the tortfeasor."
See Id., at 30, 374 A.2d at 1172.
There was no dispute that Part III (d)
meant that the $10,000 from the D.C.
driver's insurance already paid to Mrs.
McKoy should act as a set-off. The issue
became one of determining the proper
referent of the phrase "any amount payable." If this meant the total amount corresponding to the total damages, $29,000,
suffered by Mrs. McKoy, then the
$10,000 set-off would leave Aetna with a
$19,000 obligation. On the other hand, if
those words in III (d) referred to the
amount payable from Aetna to McKoy,
$20,000, then the application of the setoff would leave Aetna with a mere
$10,000 obligation.
In holding for Mrs. McKoy, the court
stated that both lII(a) and III (d) were independent modifiers of the total amounts
payable clause in Part I. Thus, the set-off
did not reduce the Aetna limit of liabilit~,
but the total sums to which that liability
was to be applied, i.e., the outstanding
amount payable to plaintiff McKoy after
the application of the $10,000 paid on
behalf of the tortfeasor.
In order to remove any doubt about the
correctness of the result, the court stated:
Even assuming that the interpretation
of the policy urged upon us by Aetna is
an equally reasonable one, this would,
at best, create an ambiguity. In such
Situations, ambiguities are resolved
against the author of the instruPenn., Etc., Ins. Co. v.
ment.
Shirer, 224 Md. 530, 537, 168 A.2d
525,528 (1961).
281 Md. at 31,374 A.2d at 1173.
The decision of the court rested entirely upon the construction of the Uninsured Motorists Endorsement issued by
Aetna. To avoid this result in future cases
involving the Uninsured Motorists
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coverage, Aetna could restructure the
language of its endorsement specifically
to limit the coverage. While it is evident
that the court intended that an insured
benefit from as much of her insurance as
possible, it could have reached a more enduring result based upon substantive law
rather than contract construction had it
dealt with the alternative argument that
the set-off clause was void under MD. ANN.
CODE art. 48A §541. This section requires
that insurers issuing policies for Maryland
drivers provide a minimum of $20,000
U!M coverage for each policy, and a court
could construe the Code to require application of the $20,000 obligation to the
balance of "any amount payable" to an
insured after application of a set-off. The
court chose not to reach this question,
and thus left this case vulnerable to isolation on its facts. See id., at 28 n.l, 374
A.2d 1171 n.l.
McKoy articulates well the problem of
uninsured motorists insurance protection--a problem acute in Maryland, which
entertains more than its share of foreign
drivers who are without sufficient
coverage of their own. It also appears that
the result in this case works a two-edged
economic sword, with one blade cutting
costs to an insurance consumer like
McKoy by holding an insurance company
to its full obligation in the manner provided by this court. The other edge,
however, narrows company profit margin
resulting in higher insurance rates.

Terry
Examined
by James F. Kuhn
The Court of Special Appeals has rendered invalid an investigatory stop based
solely on information received in a police
radio broadcast absent other indications
of present danger and criminal activity.
Price v. State, 37 Md. App., 248, 376
A.2d 1158 (1977).
On April 5, 1975, a Prince George's
County police officer on routine patrol
received a radio broadcast that an armed

robbery suspect, James Price, was
believed to be driving a silver 1966
Cadillac and that he was in possession of a
shotgun, stolen goods, and narcotics. The
officer, having sighted an automobile
matching the description given in the
broadcast down to the tag number, approached the driver when he stepped from
the car in a gas station and conducted a
patdown of the driver who at that time
identified himself as James Price. This
limited search, conducted on the basis of
the radio alert alone, produced a knife
from the person of the appellant. He was
arrested on a weapons charge and subsequently convicted on separate charges,
relating to a robbery which had occured
three weeks earlier on the basis of evidence seized by a second officer while
searching the car in the gas station.
Price's contention on appeal was that the
state had failed to establish the necessary
"reasonable suspicion" to justify his being
stopped and frisked for weapons, thus violating rights guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment.
Nine years ago, the Supreme Court
made clear in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
(1968), that police officers may "in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for
purposes of investigating possibly criminal behaviour even though there is no
probable cause for making an arrest" and
that where the officer "observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that
the persons with whom he is dealing may
be armed and presently dangerous" he
may conduct a limited frisk for weapons
by patting down the outer clothing of the
suspect. 392 U.S. at 22. Terry requires
only that the officer be able to point to
specific and articulable facts that would
justify a reasonable suspicion that the individual is armed and presents a threat to
the officer or bystanders.
In Price, the state argued that the patdown was justified under the Terry
doctrine in that a police broadcast that a
suspect is armed and dangerous in and of
itself justifies a patdown for weapons even
if it does not constitute probable cause for
arrest. The danger of too broad a reading

of the Terry doc trine lies in its abuse in
cases where the state may seek to dignify
an otherwise invalid investigatory procedure. The narrow holding in Terry was
originally intended as justification for
good faith searches, limited in scope to a
pat down for weapons in a situation reasonably perceived by the officer as presenting immediate danger. The gist of
Terry is good-faith preemption of hostile
citizen reaction to a lawful police stop;
Terry was not envisioned as applying an
excuse for bad faith or sloppy police work
and the "stop and frisk" perceived by the
Supreme Court was clearly not meant to
be a habitual law enforcement procedure.
In Price, the court noted that the officer
had concededly acted solely on the basis
of the police broadcast and that he observed nothing in the course of his approaching the defendant which indicated
that he might be armed. The court distinguished Williams v. State, 19 Md.App.
204, 310 A.2d 593 (1973), where it
upheld a "stop and frisk"based on a similar radio alert together with other circumstances which were found sufficient to
give rise to the required reasonable suspicion. Specifically, in Williams, the fact
that the automobile was parked in the
same general vicinity only ninety minutes
after a shooting incident was a specific
and articulable fact which reasonably warranted the self-protective frisk, whereas in
Price the court was faced with the question whether the police broadcast alone
would give rise to this suspicion where the
offense which was the subject of the
broadcast had occured three weeks earlier
and in another part of the county. The
unaccompanied police broadcast was held
insufficient.
The rationale underlying Terry goes to
the legitimate interest of the state in protecting its law enforcement officers from
the inherent dangers involved in the conducting of investigations of those
suspected of possible criminal activities.
The cases following Terry have been
forced to apply a balancing test between
the rights of individuals to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures and
society's interest in protecting its police
from potential threatened violence when
such is the case. The difficult question to

which the court addressed itself in this
case is whether the frisk can be upheld at
a suppression hearing where the arresting
officer has no reason other than the
broadcast for conducting the frisk and
where the prosecution is unable to identify the source of the information bringing
about the alert. Through a delicate balancing of the interests outlined in Terry,
the court has chosen not to expand its
prior holding in Williams to encompass a
situation such as that in Price.
While it might legitimately be suggested that Price almost completely
deprives police officers of the right to conduct protective frisks solely on the basis
of police radio broadcasts alerting officers
of armed and dangerous suspects (who are
identified with certainty), officers in fear
of their safety may conduct such frisks if
they can point to any specific and articulable facts supporting the broadcast
(such as in Williams) which reasonably
leads them to conclude that criminal activity is afoot and that the subject of their
investigation is armed. Furthermore, such
a frisk based on the broadcast alone will
be upheld if the facts underlying the radio
alert are established by the state at the
suppression hearing. Price, while declining to extend the former rule, reaffirms
the self-protective frisk under appropriate
circumstances and at the same time
preserves the right of the people to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures.
The narrow holding of Price requires only
that evidence seized as the result of an arrest made following a productive frisk for
weapons based solely on the radio broadcast must be suppressed both where the
accuracy underlying the broadcast cannot
be documented and in the absence of
other indicia of present danger.

T.V. Or Not
T.V.-Proof
OfVaIue
For Grand
Larceny
by John Jeffrey Ross

To obtain a conviction of a defendant
accused of grand larceny in the District of
Columbia, the Government must present
evidence that the property stolen was
worth at least $100.00. (See 22 D.C.
Code Sec. 2201). Such evidence should
include proof of the fair market value of
the item. This axiom appears to be too
simple to require judicial explanation, but
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
recently reversed a felony grand larceny
conviction because of the Government's
failure to establish the threshold value.
Williams v. United States, 376 A.2d 442
(D.C. App. 1977).
John Williams was convicted of grand
larceny after the Government convinced
the jury that he had taken a television set
(and other effects of negligible value). The
evidence showed that Mr. Williams sold
the television for $50.00 and then bought
it back for $100.00 in the hope of returning it to avoid prosecution. There was
further testimony by the complaining witness of the property's original purchase
value and state of repair.
Williams subsequently appealed this
conviction, claiming that the Government's evidence was insufficient to demonstrate a felony theft. In remanding the
case for a misdemeanor disposition the
Court of Appeals stated that the failure of
the Government's case was the reliance
on the evidence of only "a) physical presence of the items stolen and b) the
owner's statement of original cost." 376
A.2d at 443. The Court indicated that the
"fair market value" is defined as that
"price at which a willing seller and a will-
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